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the  Syphilis  Epidemic  and 
Its  Relation  to  AIDS 
ALLAN M.  BRANDT 
This article presents an overview of the history of medical 
and  public  health  responses  to  syphilis  in  the  20th- 
century United  States  and briefly evaluates the relevance 
and  significance  of  these  approaches  for  the  AIDS  epi- 
demic. The parallels are numerous:  they relate to science, 
public health,  civil liberties,  and social attitudes  concern- 
ing  sexually  transmitted  infection.  The  strengths  and 
limits of past approaches to controlling  sexually transmit- 
ted  diseases  are explored  as  a possible  guide  for  AIDS 
policy. 
N  1909,  NOBEL  LAUREATE  IMMUNOLOGIST  PAUL  EHRLICH 
announced the discovery of  Salvarsan, a cure for the dreaded 
disease  syphilis.  Ehrlich's  discovery  marked  a  fundamental 
breakthrough in the history of modern medical science; for the first 
time, a specific chemical compound had been demonstrated to kill a 
specific microorganism.  Ehrlich called the  substance-the  606th 
arsenical he had synthesized-a  "magic bullet," a drug that would 
seek out and destroy its mark. He  posited that the world of 20th- 
century bioscience would be the elucidation of magic bullets to cure 
all diseases (1). 
In the midst of the AIDS epidemic, the history of modern efforts 
to  understand and control syphilis provides an important analog. 
The  two  diseases have obvious  differences, but both  are sexually 
transmitted, have severe pathological consequences, and are greatly 
feared, and the patients are highly stigmatized. This suggests there 
may be lessons in the historical approaches to syphilis that may help 
us to understand the current health crisis. This article reviews the 
basic scientific, medical, and public health approaches to syphilis in 
the 20th  century as well as the role of social and cultural values in 
shaping perspectives on the disease. In addition, it seeks to point to 
significant comparisons  between  medical  and  public  health  ap- 
proaches to syphilis and the current AIDS  crisis. 
Magic Bullets  and the Biomedical  Model 
Ehrlich's discovery of Salvarsan  was the culmination of a genera- 
tion of research  that led to a profound shift in biomedicine. Indeed, 
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the target of  Ehrlich's bullet was  a microorganism that had only 
been  identified in  May  1905  by  two  German researchers, Fritz 
Schaudinn, a protozoologist,  and Erich Hoffmann, a syphilologist. 
Found in syphilitic chancres and other infected tissue, the spiral- 
shaped organism proved difficult to  stain, thus earning the name 
Spirochaetapallida.  Later recognized to be a treponemal organism, it 
was renamed Treponema  pallidum (2). 
The  discovery of  the  treponeme  was  rapidly followed  by  the 
development of a diagnostic test for its presence. August Wasser- 
mann and his colleagues Neisser and Bruck applied the complement- 
fixation reaction discovered by J. Bordet  and 0.  Gengou  to  the 
spirochete (3). The test involved the application of human blood to 
sheep  blood  corpuscles.  Syphilis  could  now  be  detected  in  the 
asymptomatic; moreover,  the  effect  of  treatment  could  now  be 
evaluated. 
These three major discoveries appeared to fulfill the promise of 
the biomedical revolution of the late 19th century. They rested on a 
generation of research on the germ theory of disease, the idea that 
specific diseases were caused by specific infectious organisms. In the 
last two decades of the 19th century, researchers  following the work 
of  Pasteur  and  Koch  identified  a  number  of  organisms  now 
associated with specific diseases including tuberculosis, diphtheria, 
typhoid, and cholera (4). 
Progress was also made in determining the pathology  of  infec- 
tious disease. This was particularly true in the instance of syphilis. 
From  the  16th  century until  well  into  the  19th,  most  doctors 
assumed gonorrhea and syphilis were  manifestations of  the  same 
disease. In  1837,  French venereologist  Phillipe Ricord established 
the specificity of the two infections through a series of experimental 
inoculations from syphilitic chancres. Ricord was also among the 
first physicians to differentiate primary, secondary, and late syphilis, 
the three stages of infection (5). By the end of the 19th century, the 
systemic dangers of  syphilis had been clarified. Because syphilitic 
infections appear to resolve after the initial inflammatory reaction, 
chronic ailments resulting from the disease had long been thought 
to be distinct clinical entities. Rudolf Virchow  established that the 
infection  could  be  transferred through  the  blood  to  the  internal 
organs and cause significant pathology, and by 1876  cardiovascular 
syphilis had been clearly documented in the medical literature. If the 
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incoordination and partial paralysis (tabes, locomotor  ataxia, pare- 
sis) or complete paralysis (6). Ultimately affecting the brain, syphilis 
also led to blindness and, in some cases, insanity. By the early 20th 
century, mental institutions reported that as many as one-third of all 
patients could trace their symptoms to syphilitic infection (7). 
The wide variety of syphilitic pathologies led William Osler, the 
most distinguished clinician in the United States, to tell his students 
at the  Johns Hopkins  Medical School,  "Know syphilis in  all its 
manifestations and relations, and all other things  clinical will  be 
added unto you" (8, p. 134). On another occasion he called syphilis 
the "great imitator," because its symptoms were similar to diseases 
with other etiologies  (9). 
Until  the  introduction  of  Salvarsan, syphilis was  treated in  a 
variety of  ways,  but  principally with  mercury. Debates  continue 
about the antitreponemal properties of heavy metals, but it is clear 
that mercury did not cure syphilis, and it was quite toxic, causing 
loss of teeth, tongue fissures, and hemorrhaging of the bowel. The 
state of therapeutics in the late 19th century explains in part the high 
estimates of the incidence of infection; most studies suggested that 
10% of the population was affected. Although the precise levels of 
infection cannot be known,  even conservative estimates indicated 
that, in the  absence of  effective treatments, syphilis was a health 
problem of enormous dimensions (10). 
Salvarsan  remained the treatment of choice for syphilis until the 
discovery of the effectiveness of penicillin in 1943.  Ehrlich's magic 
bullet had its shortcomings; it was toxic, difficult to administer, and 
required an extensive regimen of treatment, sometimes for as long as 
2 years. Only 25% of all treated patients apparently  received the fill 
complement of injections (11).  But at the time of its discovery, it 
was heralded as the dawn of the modern age of clinical medicine. 
Physicians throughout  the world sought  supplies of the drug and 
reported miraculous recoveries from the disease. 
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Fig.  1. A poster from the U.S.  Army's campaign against venereal disease. 
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Syphilis and Progressive  Medicine 
The developments in biomedicine in the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries came at a time of rising concern in Western societies about 
sexual mores, the family, and the nature of urban life. Indeed, even 
before the discovery of Salvarsan,  the American medical profession 
had organized to fight sexually transmitted diseases and expressed 
alarm  about their social impact. The problem of syphilis was seen as 
one dimension of a larger breakdown in values that emphasized the 
sanctity of the home, the domestic role of women, and the principle 
of strictly marital sexuality (12). 
Physicians focused attention on the impact of sexually transmitted 
infections on the family or what they called "innocent infections." 
The train of family tragedy was a frequent cultural theme in these 
years. In  1913  a hit Broadway play by French playwright Eugene 
Brieux, Damaged Goods,  told the story of a young man about to be 
married  who contracts syphilis. Though warned by his physician not 
to marry,  he disregards  this advice only to spread the infection to his 
wife and, later, to their child. The story revealed  deep cultural  values 
about science, social responsibility, and the limits of medicine (13). 
The knowledge that profligate men "visited" their sins upon their 
wives and children led to a dramatic  change in professional attitudes. 
Previously  called  a  "carnal scourge,"  syphilis  was  redefined as 
"family  poison." In 1906,  the American Medical Association held a 
symposium on  the Duty  of  the Profession to  Womanhood.  One 
physician at the conference explained (14): 
These  vipers  of venery  which are  called  clap  and pox, lurking  as they often 
do, under  the floral  tributes  of the honeymoon,  may  so inhibit  conception  or 
blight  its products  that  motherhood  becomes  either  an utter  impossibility  or 
a veritable  curse.  The ban  placed  by venereal  disease  on fetal  life  outrivals  the 
criminal  interference  with the products  of conception  as a cause of race 
suicide. 
Although physicians frequently centered attention on the impact 
of  the  diseases on  fertility, they  also examined the  wider  social 
repercussions of infection. Immigration to the United States was at 
its height during the last years of the 19th century and the first years 
of  the  20th;  more  than  650,000  immigrants arrived each year 
between 1885  and 1910.  Many doctors and social critics suggested 
that these  individuals were  bringing  syphilis  and other  venereal 
diseases into  the country. Howard  Kelly, a gynecologist  at Johns 
Hopkins, warned (15, 16): 
The  tide [of venereal  disease]  has  been  raising  [sic]  owing  to the  inpouring  of 
a large  foreign  population  with lower ideals....  Think  of these countless 
currents  flowing  daily  from  the houses  of the poorest  to those  of the richest, 
and  forming  a sort  of civic  circulatory  system  expressive  of the body  politic,  a 
circulation  which  tends  to equalize  the distribution  of morality  and  disease. 
Medical examinations at the ports where immigrants entered the 
United States failed to reveal a high incidence of disease; neverthe- 
less, nativists called for the restriction of immigration. How  were 
these immigrants spreading sexually transmitted disease to  native, 
middle-class, Anglo-Saxon Americans? First, it was suggested that 
immigrants constituted the great bulk of prostitutes who inhabited 
American cities. Second, physicians now asserted that syphilis could 
be spread in any number of  casual ways. Doctors  catalogued the 
various modes  of  transmission: pens,  pencils,  toilet  seats, door- 
knobs,  and drinking cups  (17).  We  now  know,  of  course,  that 
syphilis cannot be transmitted in these ways. This poses an impor- 
tant  historical  question:  Why  did  physicians  believe  it  could 
be? 
Theories of casual transmission of syphilis reflected deep cultural 
fears about disease and sexuality in the early 20th century (Fig. 1). 
Syphilis was viewed as a threat to the entire late Victorian social and 
sexual system, which placed great value on discipline, restraint, and 
homogeneity.  The  sexual code  of  this  era held  that only  sex in 
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syphilis also  reflected a  pervasive fear of  the  urban masses, the 
growth of the cities, and the changing nature of familial relation- 
ships (12).  Finally, the distinction between syphilis and syphilis of 
the  innocent  had  the  effect of  dividing  victims;  some  deserved 
attention, sympathy, and medical support, others did not. This, of 
course, depended on how the infection was obtained. Implicit in the 
notion of "innocent" infection was the suggestion of culpability for 
the epidemic. 
Syphilis  and World  War I 
By the time of World War I, concern about syphilis had reached 
unprecedented heights. The military draft and consequent physical 
examinations had revealed high  rates of  infection-13%  of  those 
drafted were found to be infected with either syphilis or gonorrhea 
(18).  The war touched  off the most vigorous  antivenereal disease 
campaign in American history. 
Although the military devised a program of vigorous exercise and 
explicit sexual education for the troops, the campaign centered on 
the problem of prostitution. Virtually every American city had an 
active prostitution trade in the early 20th century. It was now feared 
that soldiers in  training would  visit prostitutes, become infected, 
and be lost to the war effort. The military now  viewed these red- 
light districts as a potentially catastrophic health risk for the troops. 
Posters, films, and other  educational materials repeatedly warned 
the soldiers, "A German bullet is cleaner than a whore" (19). 
Closing  down  red-light districts became part of  the  "hygienic 
gospel," comparable to  the antituberculosis and anti-yellow  fever 
campaigns waged in these years. One federal official stated that "To 
drain a red-light district and destroy thereby a breeding place of 
syphilis and gonorrhea is as logical as it is to drain a swamp and 
thereby a breeding place of  malaria and yellow  fever" (20).  As  a 
result, local governments closed down their districts of prostitution. 
In July 1918,  the U.S.  Congress took action to support local and 
state initiatives by enacting the Chamberlain-Kahn  Act, establishing 
a "civilian quarantine and isolation fund," as part of a comprehen- 
sive  venereal disease  program.  More  than  20,000  women  were 
quarantined during the war with the assistance provided by federal 
funds, thousands more were incarcerated as a result of local pro- 
grams  (12,  21).  Barbed wire  and  guards  secured many  of  the 
institutions.  A  total  of  110  districts  such  as  "Storyville," New 
Orleans, and the "Barbary  Coast," San Francisco, were closed down 
during the course of the war. One federal official noted  (22): 
Conditions required the immediate isolation of as many venereally infected 
persons acting as spreaders of disease as could be quickly apprehended and 
quarantined. It was not  a measure instituted for the punishment of prosti- 
tutes on  account of infraction of the civil or moral law, but was strictly a 
public health measure to  prevent the spread of  dangerous, communicable 
diseases. 
Fear of venereal disease during the war led to substantial inroads on 
traditional civil liberties in  the  name of  public  health. Although 
many of  these interventions were  challenged in the  courts, most 
were upheld; the police powers of the state were deemed sufficient 
to override any constitutional concerns. Legal restraints, of course, 
fell most heavily on those considered "responsible" for the disease. 
Closing  down  red-light districts in the United  States had little 
bearing on the situation in France, where American troops arrived 
"to  make  the  World  safe  for  democracy." The  Army  officially 
forbade the  soldiers from  using  the  French regulated houses  of 
prostitution. This angered French officials  who believed that Ameri- 
can demand for street prostitutes-known  as clandestines-would 
defeat their regulatory system of medical inspections of brothels. 
Although it was widely recognized that latex condoms,  available 
since the  19th century, prevented the transmission of syphilis, the 
military declined to provide them to the troops. It was assumed that 
providing condoms  would  merely encourage sexual relationships. 
Instead, the  military established a series of  prophylactic stations 
where a soldier could  take a disinfectant treatment after a sexual 
exposure.  The  treatment,  which  involved  an  injection  into  the 
urethra, was painful and intended to serve as an inhibition to sex. 
Some reformers protested, nevertheless, that the provision of such 
treatments  promoted promiscuity among the troops when reports of 
long lines at the stations appeared in the press. Failure to undergo 
the  treatment and  the  eventual contraction  of  an  infection  was 
considered a court-martial offense. The  Army ruled that sexually 
transmitted diseases were injuries incurred "not in the line of duty," 
and infected soldiers lost their pay (23)  (Fig. 2). 
Despite  these  major  efforts  in  social  engineering  and  public 
health, rates of disease remained high during the war. The incarcera- 
tion  of  prostitutes apparently did not  serve as an effective public 
health measure. The war effort did reveal, however, the lengths to 
which  the  military and public  health officials would  go  in  their 
attempts  to  control  venereal  disease.  The  war  tested  the  basic 
assumptions of  the social hygiene  movement:  rigorous education 
"NOT  IN LINE  OF DUTY" 
Go  back  to  them 
Fig. 2. A dishonorable discharge was an outcome  phtsicalltj  fit and morally clean 
of contracting a venereal disease. In contrast, a 
reminder of American family values was intended  fcCAL  NYC  I ENE  DIV  IIO  N  A  ,  YD  C A TO10  AL  C OM  MI f  ION 
to deter promiscuity. 
22  JANUARY  I988  ARTICLES  377 promoting  sexual abstinence coupled with  vigorous  repression of 
prostitution  would  conquer  the  problem.  The  war  revealed the 
limits of this approach. 
Thomas  Parran, Surgeon  General 
Although efforts against syphilis lagged in the 1920s,  they were 
reinvigorated in  the  1930s  when  President  Franklin Roosevelt 
appointed Thomas  Parran as  Surgeon  General. Parran, a career 
public  health  officer,  had  witnessed  the  precipitous  decline  of 
communicable diseases such as diphtheria and typhoid, while in the 
same years rates of  syphilis had climbed. This seemed particularly 
ironic in the face of the development of  laboratory diagnosis and 
specific treatments. "Syphilis does a hundred times as much damage 
as poliomyelitis," Parran  explained in 1936 (24), "yet we can cure it. 
We  still  do  not  know  how  to  cure  poliomyelitis,  only  how  to 
mitigate it." He  touched  off a national campaign against syphilis 
when he wrote Shadow  on the Land, a book devoted to exposing the 
national problem of syphilis (25). 
Parran  developed a five-point plan to conquer syphilis, basing his 
program on traditional public health precepts. First, was the need to 
find cases.  For  this  purpose,  he  called for  the  establishment of 
diagnostic centers where individuals could obtain free, confidential 
tests. The rationale behind finding these cases was to bring infected 
individuals under immediate treatment. Thus prompt therapy con- 
stituted  Parran's second  recommendation;  delay  after  infection 
made treatment more  difficult and  increased the  possibility  that 
others would  be  infected. Third, Parran advocated tracing of  all 
sexual contacts of  infected  individuals so  that they too  could  be 
tested and treated if necessary. To prevent infection among marital 
partners and their children, he called for mandatory premarital  and 
prenatal  blood testing. Finally, the Surgeon General recommended a 
massive program of public education emphasizing prevention and 
the  need for recognition  of  symptoms  and treatment if infection 
occurred. 
Parran explicitly sought  to  avoid the traditional moralistic per- 
spectives on syphilis that held that the disease was the result of moral 
turpitude. He  sought to divorce his program from the traditional 
concerns of the social hygienists. Nevertheless, he found that he was 
repeatedly blocked  by  social  conventions  that  held  that  public 
discussion of syphillis and other venereal diseases was inappropriate. 
Despite  the  brief interruption during World  War I,  syphilis re- 
mained cloaked in what was known as "the conspiracy of silence"- 
it was not to be discussed in respectable society. As Prince Morrow, 
the  leader of  the  social hygiene  movement,  had noted  in  1906: 
"Social sentiment holds that it is a greater violation of the properties 
of life publicly to mention venereal disease than privately  to contract 
it" (26). Paul de Kruif, a science writer, had repeatedly attempted to 
place an  article on  syphilis  in  the  Ladies Home Journal without 
success. When Parran attempted to discuss the problem of venereal 
disease in a radio broadcast on CBS in 1934, he was censored from 
using the words syphilis and gonorrhea (12, 27). 
Parran sought  to  break through  the  "conspiracy of  silence" to 
"stamp out syphilis." The culmination of Parran's  campaign was the 
passage of the National Venereal Disease Control Act in 1938. The 
Act  provided for federal grants to  the  state boards of  health to 
develop programs against venereal disease. Congress allocated $15 
million  over  a  3-year period  to  support  clinics  and educational 
activities (28).  The  number of  state-supported clinics rose from 
1750 in July 1938 to almost 3000  by 1940. Diagnostic laboratories 
were  expanded,  as  were  epidemiological  services and  treatment 
facilities for  those  who  could  not  afford them.  The  number of 
serological  tests  administered by  state  laboratories increased by 
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Fig. 3. A public health 
poster from the  1930s 
campaign  advocating 
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300% between 1936 and 1940; funds from the Act helped to make 
the necessary diagnostic facilities available. "Since the detection of 
syphilis is to  a large extent dependent upon  mass blood-testing," 
noted Raymond Vonderlehr of the U.S. Public Health Service, "this 
increase in laboratory tests for syphilis is perhaps the best index of 
the effort which has been made to discover and bring to treatment 
infected individuals" (29, p. 132).  This meant that more cases now 
came under treatment during the early stages of the disease when 
therapy proved most effective. The "shadow on the land"  had begun 
to lift. 
The  public health campaign increasingly focused on  the use of 
serological  tests  (Fig.  3).  In  1935,  Connecticut  passed the  first 
legislation requiring a blood  test and physical examination for all 
prospective brides and grooms.  By the end of  1938,  26  states had 
enacted provisions prohibiting the marriage of infected individuals 
(30).  Most  of  these  states  now  required  individuals  seeking  a 
marriage license to  take a blood  test  for syphilis. An  individual 
would have to be found to be noninfectious in order to proceed with 
the marriage. 
The tests rested on  a series of  assumptions about sexuality that 
were not always reflected empirically. It was assumed that everyone 
would eventually pass through the sieve of marriage; all infections 
would then be discovered and treated. The legislation never explicit- 
ly recognized the nature of sexual mores and the issue of premarital 
and extramarital  sexuality. As syphilologists John Stokes and Nor- 
man Ingraham noted in 1939,  "The fact that sexual intercourse has 
preceded  application  for  the  certificate [of  marriage] is  such  a 
commonplace that it is a question whether the mere withholding of 
its issuance ...  has more than a small fraction of  the preventive 
significance attached to it" (31). 
Public  health  officials  also  encouraged  voluntary  testing  and 
treatment. In Chicago, for example, with the assistance of publicity 
provided by the Chicago Tibune,  the local, state, and federal health 
bureaucracies developed  a comprehensive plan to  rid the  city of 
syphilis. Questionnaires were mailed to more than a million Chicago 
families to  ascertain their interest in such a campaign. More than 
261,000  persons indicated their desire to receive a free blood test. 
At the height of the program, 10,000  to  12,000  individuals daily 
were tested in what Parran  called a "Wassermann  dragnet."  Between 
1937  and  1940  over  31%  of  the  city's entire  adult population 
received Wassermann tests. Some 56,000  individuals infected with 
syphilis were identified and treated-all  at public expense (32). 
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represented  as  an  evil 
woman,  was viewed  as a 
military  enemy  in World 
War II. 
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Parran's  program, which emphasized case-finding and treatment, 
was never systematically  evaluated. His campaign did, however, lead 
to a better public understanding of the significance of infection and 
ways to avoid it. The broader provision of diagnostic and treatment 
facilities led to a decline in rates  of infection. Compulsory premarital 
screening, however, adopted by virtually every state between 1935 
and 1945,  never proved to  be an effective means of finding new 
cases. Physicians pointed to the problem of false positive tests that 
could occur because of technical problems with the test or as a result 
of biological phenomena. As the concepts of sensitivity (the test's 
performance  among those with the disease) and specificity (the test's 
performance among  those  free  of  infection)  were  clarified, the 
oversensitivity of tests like the Wassermnann  was revealed. As many 
as 25%  of  individuals who  tested  positive  were  actually free of 
infection;  nevertheless,  these  individuals often  underwent  toxic 
treatment on  the  assumption  that  the  tests  were  correct. With 
syphilis, a positive blood test did not always mean that an individual 
was capable of  transmitting the  disease. Although  the  tests were 
refined,)  inaccuracies did persist. Moreover, the tests tended to  be 
directed at a group at relatively lower risk of infection; this further 
compromised their accuracy. Finally, there is some  evidence that 
infected individuals merely avoided the test altogether (33). 
Many of  the  difficulties associated with  high  numbers of false 
positives were alleviated as new more specific tests were developed 
in the 1940s and,  1950s, but the central problem remained; premari- 
tal tests failed to  identify a significant percentage of  the infected 
population. For example, in  1978  premarital screening accounted 
for only 1.27% of all national tests found to be positive for syphilis. 
The costs of these programs were estimated at $80 million annually 
(34).  It  seems  likely that  premarital screening  rarely served the 
function of preventing infections within marriage that its advocates 
assumed it  would.  These  data led  a number of  states to  repeal 
mandatory serologies in the early 1980s. 
Syphils  in the Age of Antibiotics 
During  World  War II  antisyphilis efforts again intensified. A 
major campaign against prostitution was initiated, as were efforts at 
p  c  c  n  t uniker.  th  .-e  p  &c i  World War I 
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rates of  disease were  controlled.  With  the  additional therapeutic 
breakthrough of penicillin, the military had the armamentarium  to 
control the disease (35). 
In  early  1943,  John  S.  Mahoney  of  the  U.S.  Public  Health 
Service, using a strain of penicillin provided by Howard Florey and 
Ernst Chain at Oxford, found that the drug was effective in treating 
syphilitic rabbits. Realizing the potential implications of his discov- 
ery, Mahoney moved directly to repeat the experiment with human 
subjects. By  September he  had  announced  his  findings  and the 
massive production of penicillin was under way (4). 
Just as Ehrlich's discovery had constituted a revolution in modem 
therapeutic  approaches to  infectious  disease,  so  now  penicillin 
beckoned the era of antibiotics. The incidence of syphilis fell from a 
high of  72  cases per 100,000  in  1943  to  about 4 per 100,000  in 
1956  (35).  In  the  last years of  the  1950s,  as rates of  infection 
reached all-time lows, it appeared that syphilis would join the ranks 
of  other  infectious  diseases that had come  under the  control  of 
modem  medicine. 
Despite the widespread availability  of antibiotics, rates of syphilis 
began to  climb  again in the  early 1960s.  Although  many public 
health officials and physicians attributed this increase to what they 
called the three "p's," permissiveness, promiscuity, and "the pill," 
the rise also correlates with a substantial fall in funding for public 
venereal disease programs. From a high of $18  million allocated in 
1947, the federal venereal disease budget fell to $3 million in 1955. 
By the late 1950s much of the machinery, especially procedures for 
public education, case-finding, tracing, and diagnostics, had been 
cut back (36). 
The  bitter irony of  syphilis is that the  "magic bullet" did not 
eliminate  the  disease. The  Centers for  Disease  Control  recently 
reported an increase in cases of primary and secondary syphilis. The 
estimated annual rate per  100,000  population  rose from  10.9  to 
13.3 cases, the largest increase in over 10 years (37). 
AIDS  in Historical  Perspective 
AIDS, obviously, is a disease considerably different from syphilis. 
Caused  by  a  human  retrovirus, human  immunodeficiency virus 
(HIV),  it attacks the immune system, leaving affected individuals 
vulnerable to a host of other infectious agents. In addition to being 
transmitted sexually, HIV  can be transmitted through blood trans- 
fusion  as  well,  thus  making  intravenous  drug  users who  share 
needles a principal risk group for infection. Unlike the statistics for 
syphilis, in AIDS,  principal morbidity and mortality occur among 
young  people;  the  most  serious consequences of  syphilis usually 
come  in  the  late  stage  of  the  disease,  among  older  individuals. 
Finally and most significantly, at this moment there are no curative 
treatments for AIDS and no means of rendering infected individuals 
noninfectious.  Despite  these  important differences, however,  the 
history of syphilis presents a series of striking parallels  to the many 
problems raised by AIDS. 
AIDS, like syphilis in the past, engenders powerful social conflicts 
about the meaning, nature, and risks  of sexuality; the nature and role 
of the state in protecting and promoting public health; the signifi- 
cance of  individual rights in regard to  communal good;  and the 
nature of the doctor-patient relationship and social responsibility. 
The  analogs that AIDS  poses to  this brief history of  syphilis are 
striking: the  pervasive fear of  contagion,  concerns  about  casual 
transmission,  the stigmatization  of victims, and the conflicts  be- 
tween  public  health  and  civil  liberties.  The response  to AIDS will be 
a function  of our own time, our own culture,  and  our own science. 
The importance  of the history  of syphilis  is that  it reminds  us of that 
range  of forces  that influence  disease,  health,  and social  policy. 
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ted  diseases has swung  between  two  essential approaches to  the 
problem. The first, clearly articulated by the social hygiene move- 
ment,  contended  that the  best way  to  prevent infection was  by 
adherence to  a sexual ethic that made it impossible to  acquire an 
infection. Essentially this meant restricting sexual relationships to 
marriage. The principal means of achieving this goal was through 
education to  encourage abstinence and the repression of prostitu- 
tion,  assumed to  be the central locus of  infection. The alternative 
view,  instrumental in orientation, sought  to sever the problem of 
sexually transmitted diseases from any particular sexual ethic. Ac- 
cording to this position,  represented in Thomas Parran's  approach 
during the  1930s,  individuals should  be provided with  means of 
preventing infection and, if infected, appropriate treatment. 
These two long-standing approaches have been widely voiced in 
the  first 5  years of  the AIDS  epidemic. Adherents of  the  moral 
approach argue that the instrumental approach actually encourages 
infection by unwittingly promoting sexual behavior-according  to 
this  argument good  morals and good  health go  hand  in  hand. 
Advocates of the instrumental orientation counter that the moralists 
promote  infection  by  restricting access to  explicit education and 
preventive techniques. Both approaches reflect implicit social values 
about sexuality, medicine, and disease. 
It is important to realize that merely invoking the public health 
approaches that have characterized  antisyphilis programs is unlikely 
to stem the tide of the AIDS epidemic. Screening of low-prevalence 
populations,  such  as premarital couples,  is  unlikely to  have any 
significant impact on the course of the epidemic. Not only will such 
programs find relatively few new cases, they will also find relatively 
large percentages of false positives (38). Moreover, the inability to 
treat and render noninfectious those individuals found to be infected 
severely limits the potential benefits of such mandatory measures. 
Other  programs,  however,  attempted  in  the  past,  may  offer 
strategies  for  the  future.  Intensive  education  programs  during 
World  War  II  informed  soldiers  of  risks  and  the  widespread 
provision  of  condoms  protected them  from infection.  Voluntary 
confidential testing during the  1930s  led to  a decline in rates of 
infection  in  certain  urban  areas like  Chicago.  Such  programs, 
considered radical at those  times, may provide some  insights for 
contemporary approaches to combat AIDS. 
The search for magic bullets against AIDS  will continue in the 
years ahead. But it is worth remembering that even a magic bullet 
will  not  end the AIDS  epidemic. Both  syphilis and AIDS  reveal 
certain limitations of the biomedical model of disease. No  doubt, 
effective treatments for specific diseases are a critical component in 
their control, but as the history of syphilis indicates, they are not a 
panacea. Infectious diseases constitute complex bioecological prob- 
lems in which host, parasite, and a range of social and environmental 
forces interact (39). No single medical or social intervention can thus 
adequately address  the problem. Just as penicillin did not "solve"  the 
problem of syphilis, no single treatment or even vaccine is likely to 
free us from AIDS,  at least in the immediate fiuture.  Just as social 
mores and practices change, so too the biological system is in flux. 
New  infections such as AIDS  may appear, or infectious diseases 
once  controlled  may  become  intransigent as the  organism itself 
changes. 
For this reason, it seems that a more complex model of disease is 
required to effectively direct policy-a  model sensitive to the varied 
biological, psychological,  and social factors shaping the nature of 
disease (40).  Both  the  syphilis and the AIDS  epidemics strongly 
suggest  the need to  better understand the  relationship of  human 
behavior to  health. Behavior is  subject to  a range of  influences, 
biological  and cultural, economic  and political. As the history of 
syphilis demonstrates, the modification of behavior to reduce risk of 
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disease has rarely  responded simply to fear or moral exhortation. In 
this  light,  considerable social  science  and  behavioral research is 
required to identify effective approaches to education and behavior 
modification. 
In the meantime, the devices of bioscience, clinical medicine, and 
public health will be powerfully tested by the AIDS epidemic. As the 
history of syphilis makes clear, the response to AIDS will clarify  the 
very nature of our science, culture, and society (41). In this sense, 
AIDS,  like all epidemic disease, constitutes a natural experiment in 
the ability of social institutions to respond effectively and humanely 
to a biological crisis. 
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